Abstract. The likelihood principle of Bayesian statistics implies that information about the experimental design from which evidence is collected does not enter into the statistical analysis of the data. In the present paper, I argue that information about the experimental design is nevertheless of value for an assessment of the reliability of the experiment, which is a pre-experimental measure of how well a contemplated experiment is expected to discriminate between hypotheses. I show that reliability assessments enter into Bayesian inquiries and eliminate some extreme cases of optional stopping.
experiments, I maintain that a major concern in any statistical inquiry is the reliability of one's experiment. Reliability indicates how well an experiment can distinguish a true hypothesis from among alternatives. I argue that reliability assessments will restrict Bayesians' choices of experimental designs and thereby eliminate some extreme cases where a question of optional stopping might otherwise arise.
The Likelihood Principle and Experimental
Design. An implication of the likelihood principle is that it renders irrelevant certain aspects about the design of the experiment from which the evidence was collected. This consequence is best understood when evaluating the validity of optional stopping plans. Edwards, Lindman, and Savage (1963, 193) note:
The likelihood principle emphasized in Bayesian statistics implies, among other things, that the rules governing when data collection stops are irrelevant to data interpretation.
It is entirely appropriate to collect data until a point has been proven or disproven, or until the data collector runs out of time, money, or patience.
To see the full import of the likelihood principle for optional stopping, consider the following illustration, which is The Likelihood Principle ! Page 5 oversimplified from actual practice in order to highlight the theoretical point. Suppose that a researcher is conducting a binomial experiment to investigate whether a new drug is better than a placebo. In the experiment, each trial is a comparative recovery rate on a pair of subjects. Each trial is independent, given the treatment effects, and takes the value of "0" ("unfavorable" to the new drug) or "1" ("favorable" to the new drug). The experiment tests a set of hypotheses H and H 0 1 regarding the value of the parameter 2, which indicates the true probability of a "favorable" outcome. Specifically, the experiment tests the hypothesis H : 2 = 2 = ½ and H : 2 = 2 = t,
where t is some value greater than ½. The researcher's prior probability distribution over the two hypotheses is uniform (i.e., P(H ) = P(H ) = .5). probability of the former error is denoted " and the latter $.
Any two experiments yielding evidence corresponding to identical " and $ probabilities will have the same evidential import.
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Error probabilities will be influenced by the design of the experiment. Suppose that a researcher applying a Neyman-Pearson test attempts to establish the truth of H (i.e., reject H ) by 1 0 sampling until obtaining evidence corresponding to an " level (also called the "significance" level) of .05. Under this circumstance, the " level calculated for a fixed-sample-size test will not be appropriate for evaluating the evidence. Because the researcher is continually looking for a "significant" result, there will be a higher probability of finding one purely by chance than if the test were performed merely once, at the final stage of the experiment, as in a fixed-sample-size experiment. In fact, Anscombe (1954, 92-93) has noted that the law of the iterated logarithm shows that, with probability one, a significant result will occur if the researcher continues to sample and apply a fixed-sample-size test.
To compensate for this problem of reasoning to a foregone conclusion, procedures have been developed that adjust the " level according to the number of times a test is applied while evidence is accumulating. Armitage, McPherson, and Rowe (1969, 236-237) have outlined a sequential plan for this purpose. They note that, to calculate the error probability of rejecting H 0 when a test is applied after each trial, the researcher must determine the probability, given the truth of H , that a 0 significant result will occur on or before the given trial. This
The Likelihood Principle ! Page 8 "overall" significance level will be larger than the nominal significance level of the fixed-sample-size experiment, and, as the sample size increases, the overall probability will become very large and approach one.
The Reliability of Experiments.
There is a fundamental difference in concerns between Bayesian statistical analysis and frequentist statistical analysis underlying each's respective consequences for the design of experiments. Bayesian statistical analysis is concerned primarily with yielding numerical measures of the degree to which evidence confirms the hypotheses being assessed (see Howson (1997, 268-279) ). This probabilistic characterization of the relationship between evidence and hypotheses implies that any bearing that the evidence has on the hypotheses is contained only in the outcome actually observed.
3
The other instances of evidence and the frequencies with which they occur are irrelevant to the import of the obtained evidence and do not enter into the statistical analysis. In the example considered above, the fact that the Bayesian sequential plan will only terminate with evidence confirming hypothesis H , and will 1 never terminate with evidence confirming hypothesis H , has no 0 bearing on the statistical analysis once evidence in favor of H 1 is observed.
In contrast to Bayesian statistical analysis, frequentist
The Likelihood Principle ! Page 9 statistical analysis requires a researcher to average over possible observations when making an inference. Consequently, if a researcher attempts to establish the truth of H through a 1 sequential sampling plan that could never indicate significant evidence for H , then such information will enter into the 0 statistical analysis. Mayo (1996, 7) notes that this information permits researchers to perform an assessment of the reliability of the experiment being used to collect the evidence. A Reliable experiment is one which, with a high probability, can indicate the true hypothesis among alternatives. The measure of reliability reflects the efficiency of the experiment and is attached to the long-run success of the design chosen by the researcher (see Hacking (1980, 143) ).
How well an experiment facilitates choosing the true hypothesis will depend upon the specific design selected by the researcher. When planning an experiment to test hypothesis H 1 against H , for example, a researcher interested in assuring with 0 a high probability that the true hypothesis is chosen might apply a design that reduces " to .05 and $ to .05. Only 5% of the time will this method erroneously accept H and only 5% of the time 1 will it erroneously accept H . In the restricted, technical sense 0 in which the term "reliable" is being used here, such an experiment would be considered highly reliable, and considered more reliable than one that merely focuses on the probability of the critical ratio 8, at which point the researcher will judge H 1 to be confirmed and report its posterior probability.
The other experimental plan, E', is also a sequential plan.
It is carried out according to the following rules:
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(1) If P(x|2 )/P(x|2 ) $ 8, then stop the experiment and 1 0 report the posterior probability of H (i.e., confirm H ). (1) nor (2) obtain, continue sampling.
Unlike plan E, this plan permits an assessment of the truth of H 0 as well as H . Furthermore, with probability one, the plan will 1 terminate.
Suppose that the researcher begins collecting evidence and that, after, say, the 50th trial, observes a likelihood ratio of (. How this evidence is interpreted will depend upon which sampling plan the researcher adopted at the start of the experiment. If the researcher adopted plan E, then the inference at the 50th trial will be to "continue sampling." If, however, the researcher adopted plan E', then the inference at the 50th trial will be to "stop the experiment and report the posterior probability of H ." The two experimental plans yield different 0 results even though the evidence collected by the 50th trial is the same.
In this illustration, plan E is unreliable. The plan will never permit the researcher to stop the experiment with
The Likelihood Principle ! Page 12 confirming evidence for H . In fact, at a particular trial n, the 0 researcher may observe evidence that has a likelihood ratio extremely favorable to H , and the researcher may continue to 0 observe such evidence favorable to H as the experiment 0 continues, but such data cannot be used as disconfirming evidence against H . The broader implication here is that the researcher 1 has no guarantee that the experiment will ever stop. Kadane, Schervish, and Seidenfeld (1996, 1229) have provided a formula for determining the positive probability of non-termination of an experiment such as E. Where p is the "prior" probability of H 1 and q is its "posterior" probability, the bound for the conditional probability of terminating an experiment when H is 1 false is p(1-q)/q (1-p) . If the researcher carrying out plan E requires the critical ratio 8 to be such that q = .99, then (given p = .5) the probability of terminating the experiment when H is false will not exceed .01. Any attempt to increase the 1 probability of termination will be offset by an increased probability of confirming H when H is actually true. if there is any cost at all to experimentation, then the expected costs of adopting plan E will be boundless.
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The problems just cited are not restricted to Bayesian sequential experiments. A Neyman-Pearson experiment that permits a researcher only to accept H will also be unreliable. The 1 adjustment of the " probability for such a plan, as Armitage, McPherson, and Rowe (1969, 236-237) prescribe, does not avoid the fact that the plan will never permit the researcher to accept H .
0
A more reliable experiment would be Wald's (1947, 37-44) sequential probability ratio plan. This plan incorporates error probabilities, but it also permits hypothesis H to be accepted See Berger and Wolpert (1984) and Birnbaum (1962) for 1 comprehensive discussions of the likelihood principle. The principle also has been discussed in the work of Edwards, Lindman, and Savage (1963, 237-238) , Hacking (1965, 106-109) , Mayo (1996, 337-359) , and Savage (1962, 17-18) . Kadane, Schervish, and Seidenfeld (1996) have shown that, with 2 such a sampling plan, the researcher cannot be certain that the plan will stop. Birnbaum (1962, 271 ) labels this assumption the principle of 3 conditionality. It asserts the "irrelevance of experiments not actually performed." For a detailed discussion of the principle of conditionality, see Berger and Wolpert (1984, 5-18) .
This consequence was recognized by Teddy Seidenfeld and shared 4 with me during personal communication.
